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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) gives this court jurisdiction.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question of law certified by the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Utah is: Whether funds transferred directly from one exempt account, as
described in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), to another exempt account within
one year before a debtor files bankruptcy constitute "amounts contributed" within
the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii)?
a.

Standard of review: "Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of
law which we review for correctness, according no particular deference to
the trial court's interpretation."1

b.

Citation to the record: Objection to Exemption and Notice of Hearing,
March 13, 2003.2
DETERMINATIVE LAW

Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) provides:
(l)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following
property:

1

State v. Yanez, 441 Utah Adv. Rep. 14,42 P.3d 1248 (Utah App.2002)(quoting
State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, HI 4, 18 P.3d 504, cert denied, 53 P.3d l(Utah
2002)).
2

Stephen W. Rupp, Trustee objected to the debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz' claimed
exemption of the IRA account under §78-23-5(l)(a)(x) because under section 78-235(l)(b)(ii) "amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of the debtor
within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy" are not exempt.
6

(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or
other assets held for or payable to the individual as a
participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan
or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h),
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e)
of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended; and
Utah Code Annotated §78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) provides:
(l)(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does
not apply to:
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf
of a debtor within one year before the debtor files for
bankruptcy.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS
Nature of the case: The underlying case involves a debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz,
who transferred or rolled-over IRA funds from one IRA account to a new IRA account
within 1 year prior to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.
Course of Proceedings: The debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz, filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy petition on November 27, 2002. On the debtor's statements and schedules,
schedule B, paragraph 11, page 15, the debtor listed an interest in an IRA in the
amount of $22,826.00. On schedule C of the debtor's statements and schedules, the
debtor claimed the IRA as exempt from property of the estate pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated section u78-23-5(l)(a)(x), 78-23-(6)(c) and Rule 64D 11 U.S.C. 541." On
March 13, 2002, Stephen W. Rupp, Trustee, objected to the claimed exemption of the

7

IRA account.3 On April 24, 2003 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah took the "Objection to Exemption" question under advisement.4 On June 10,
2003 the Bankruptcy Court certified the above question of unsettled law to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah.
Disposition below: The Bankruptcy Court certified a question of unsettled law to
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Statement of the facts: Debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz, transferred or rolled-over
IRA funds from one IRA account to a new IRA account at Wachovia Securities within
1 year prior to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Mr. Kunz participated in an
individual retirement account at Merrill Lynch, Account No. 260-84S84. In August of
2002, roughly 3 months prior to the bankruptcy petition date, IRA funds in the amount
of $20,784.19 were transferred from the Merrill Lynch IRA account into a Wachovia
Securities IRA account. Kunz argues the IRA Funds are exempt pursuant to 78-235(l)(a)(x). The Trustee objected to Kunz's claimed exemption arguing that the IRA
Funds lost their exemption under section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) because the transfer or
rollover of the funds within one year of the bankruptcy petition is a contribution under
that subsection.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The exemption claimed by the debtor does not apply to contributions or

3

See "Objection to Exemption and Notice of Hearing" ECF docket #18.

4

See Minute entry dated April 24, 2003 on the bankruptcy docket.
8

"amounts contributed" to an IRA account made one year prior to the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. The transfer or rollover of the funds by the debtor within one year
prior to filing his bankruptcy petition is a contribution. Besides the ordinary definition
of contribution, the term contribution is also a term of art. In section 78-23-5(1 )(b) the
term is used broadly without limitation. Industry standards, plans and applicable
federal statutes indicate that a rollover is a type of contribution. In addition, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, in interpreting the meaning of
"amounts contributed" as found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii), the very
statute at issue in this case, stated that "if the Utah legislature intended to differentiate
between various types of contributions, it would have done so by express reference to
their definitions within the Internal Revenue Code. . . Therefore, 'amounts contributed'
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii) includes, but is not limited to, those
amounts rolled over from ERISA-qualified plans to an IRA Annuity."5 Given the plain
meaning of "amounts contributed" as used in § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii), industry standards,
plans and caselaw interpreting "amounts contributed" to include amounts rolled over,
the rollover by the debtor in this case is a contribution.
ARGUMENT
1.

The facts of the case should be limited to the factual findings of the United
Stated Bankruptcy Court.

5

In re Hong, 2002 WL 1465737 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002); The In re Hong
memorandum decision and order is attached to this brief in the Addendum.
9

When addressing a certified question from a federal court, the Utah Supreme
Court does not "refind the facts."6 The Utah Supreme Court noted in Hansen v. Sea
Ray Boats, Inc.1 that where the federal court has already made findings of fact,
additional facts presented to the Supreme Court will not be considered.8 Where no
technical finding of facts has been made by the Federal Court, "[t]he pertinent facts are
extracted from the order of certification." Thus, the pertinent facts in this case, as
outlined by the bankruptcy court, are limited to those facts set out in the Joint Order
Certifying Question to Utah State Supreme Court.
2.

A rollover is a contribution under the plain meaning of "amounts
contributed."
The Supreme Court of Utah has consistently relied on the plain meaning of

statutory language unless the statutory language is ambiguous.9 The Utah Exemptions
Act (U.C.A. 78-23-1 et seq.) does not define the terms "contribution" or "amounts
contributed." Lacking a definition "[t]here is a presumption that the legislature
intended to use the actual words it utilizes in the statute, which in turn . . . are intended

6

Burkholz v. Joyce, 349 Utah Adv. Rep 57, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236, (Utah 1998).

7

830 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1992).

'Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1992).
9

See State v. Bluff, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 52 P.3d 1210, 1221 (Utah 2002); State
v. Burns, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 4 P.3d 795, 799-800 (Utah 2000); Evans v. State 346
Utah Adv.Rep. 3, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998).
10

to be utilized in the ordinary and common meaning."10 The best evidence of legislative
intent "is the plain language of the act."11

The language of the act in this statute is

unambiguous; The exemption of section 78-23-5(b)(ii) does not apply to any "amounts
contributed . . . within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy." The plain
meaning of "amounts contributed" includes any funds deposited into a retirement
account.
Black's Law Dictionary does not define "amounts contributed" nor does it give
an applicable definition of "contribution" either under the definition of "contribution or
under the definition of "individual retirement account." The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines "contribute" as "to give a part to a common fund or store." In this
case, through the rollover, the debtor gave "a part to a common fund" and that part
was the amount rolled over.

In August of 2002, roughly 3 months prior to the

bankruptcy petition date, IRA funds in the amount of $20,784.19 were transferred from
the Merrill Lynch IRA account into a Wachovia Securities IRA account. These
transferred funds resulted in an increase to the balance of the Wachovia Securities IRA
account in the amount of $20,784.19. Applying Merriam-Webster's definition of
"contribute," meaning "to give a part to a common fund," there can be no doubt that
the rolled over funds resulted in a contribution to the Wachovia Securities IRA account.

10

Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:27

11

State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995).
11

3.

The legislative intent indicates that rollovers were not specifically excluded
from the meaning of "amounts contributed."
In attempting to decipher the meaning of "amounts contributed" as found in

Utah Code Annotated section 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) the United States Bankruptcy Court,
District of Utah stated: "If the Utah legislature intended to differentiate between various
types of contributions, it would have done so by express reference to their definitions
within the Internal Revenue Code."12 The Hong court based this statement on the
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "is strengthened where a thing is provided
in one part of the statute and omitted in another. "13 Applying this maxim to section 7823-5 the following is learned. Subsection (b) of section 78-23-5 directly references
definitions found in the Internal Revenue Code to clarify the terms used in the
subsection.14 The Hong court concludes that the use of the Internal Revenue Code
reflects "the legislature's awareness and ability to make reference to definitions within
the Internal Revenue Code."15 Conversely, the legislature fails to reference the Internal
Revenue Code to define "contributions." The Hong court concluded that "[juxtaposed
with subsection (b)(i), it must be presumed that the legislatures exclusion or omission

12

In re Hong, 2002 WL 1465737 at 5 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002).

13

Id. at 5 (citing Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23 (6th ed.2000).

14

Utah Code Ann. §78-23-5(l)(b)(referring to the definitions of "alternate payee
and "qualified domestic relations order" as defined in the Internal Revenue Code).
15

In re Hong, 2002 WL 1465737 at 5 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002).
12

of a reference to the Internal Revenue Code in subsection (b)(ii) was intentional.
4.

According to industry standards, "contribution" includes rollovers.
As background for this section, there are only two ways for an investor to get

money into a plan; first, money can be deposited into the account from an outside
source. All such methods of depositing money into the account from an outside source,
whether by the employee, employer or through a rollover from another account are
understood in thefinancialindustry as a contribution to that account. The only other
way to get fiinds into a plan is through a return on the plan's principal sometimes called
income or earnings. Keeping this return, income or earnings in the plan does not
amount to a contribution. The Internal Revenue Code only concerns itself with
contributions and limits how these contributions can be made.
In defining individual retirement accounts, the Internal Revenue Code
specifically refers to rollovers from one IRA account to another IRA account as
"rollover contributions."17 The combination of rollover and contribution in the same
defined term indicates that rollover is being used by legislators as an adjective,
describing the type of contribution. A rollover contribution is a type of and included in

16

Id at 5.

17

See 26 U.S.C. 408 (stating "Except in the case of a rollover contribution
described in subsection (d)(3), in [FN1] section 402(c), 403(a)(4), 403(b)(8), and
457(e)(16) [FN2] no contribution will be accepted unless it is in cash, and contributions
will not be accepted for the taxable year on behalf of any individual in excess of the
amount in effect for such taxable year under section 219(b)(l)(A))(emphasis added).

13

the broad definition of contribution. Section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) specifically uses the term
contribution in its broadest sense, thus including all contributions, including rollover
contributions. At no point in section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) is the term "amounts
contributed" limited. Thus, the legislature's use of "amounts contributed" should
include "rollover contributions" barring contrary instructions from the legislature.
Such use is consistent with the Hong Court's finding that a rollover is a contribution.
In a separate matter between this same debtor and Trustee an issue is being
litigated regarding the debtor's 401 (k) plan. The debtor's prototype plan also defines
rollovers as contributions. Section 4.02 of the prototype plan states: "Any Participant.
. . may contribute cash or other property to the Trust other than as a voluntary
contribution if the contribution is a 'rollover contribution' which the Code permits[.]"
Because there are only two methods of adding money to a plan, the Internal Revenue
Code and entire financial industry define and treat rollovers as contributions. The
widespread use of "rollover contribution" leads to the conclusion that the rollover in
this case was a contribution as defined by federal statute and as used in the financial
industry. The rolled over funds therefore should be included in the Utah Exemption
Act's definition of "amounts contributed."
5.

Courts addressing this same issue have concluded that barring further
clarification through legislation, a rollover is a contribution.
In a line of cases from the state of Pennsylvania interpreting a Pennsylvania

exemption statute, courts faced the task of determining whether funds rolled over from
14

an employer's ERISA employee benefit plan into an individual Retirement Account
(IRA) amounted to a contribution. The applicable Pennsylvania statute at the date of
the decision in In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501 (3d Cir. 1997), provided:
(b) Retirement funds and accounts.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following
money or other property of the judgment debtor shall be
exempt from attachment or execution on a judgment:
(ix) Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under
section 401(a), 403(a and (b), 408 or 409 of the internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (public Law 99-514, 26 U.S.C. §
401(a), 403(a and (b), 408 or 409), the appreciation thereon,
the income and the benefits or annuity payable thereunder.
This subparagraph shall not apply to:
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or
annuity fund within one year before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy.
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or
annuity fund in excess of $15,000 within a one-year
period.18
The Barshak court concluded that "subsection B simply does not distinguish
between 'rollover contributions' and 'contributions' as it places the limitation of the
exemption on amounts 'contributed.' It would be a pure judicial construct to exclude
'rollover contributions' from subsection B, and we will not engage in that process."19
The year following the decision in Barshak the Pennsylvania legislature amended
subsection (b)(l)(ix)(A) and (B) to read as follows:
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or
annuity fund within one year before the debtor filed for
18

42 Pa.C.S.A. §8124(b)(l)(1997)(emphasis added).

19

In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501, 504 (3rd Cir. 1997).
15

bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly rolled
overfromother funds which are exemptfromattachment
under this paragraph.
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or
annuity fund in excess of $15,000 within a one-year period.
This shall not include amounts directly rolled over from
other funds which are exemptfromattachment under this
paragraph?0
By amending the applicable statutes the Pennsylvania legislature specifically excluded
from "amounts contributed," rolled over funds. Simply applying such a meaning
without express instruction from the legislature is reading more into the statute than
appears on its face. Without clarification the plain meaning of the statute controls and
"amounts contributed" includes rolled over funds. Thus, the fact that the contribution
in this case was a "rollover contribution" instead of any other type of contribution,
makes no difference because the Utah Exemptions Act does not differentiate between a
"contribution" and a "rollover contribution."
6.

Improper certification
The United States Bankruptcy Court District of Utah previously addressed this

exact issue in In re Hong. "Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law is
decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of the same or a lower rank in
subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue."21 The Supreme Court of Utah has

20

42 Pa.C.S.A. §8124(b)(l)(ix)(A)(as amended 1998)(emphasis added).

2l

Hale v. Beckstead, All Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 74 P.3d 628, 634 (Thome dissenting,
Utah App. 2003)
16

gone so far as to say: "This doctrine, under which the first decision by a court on a
particular questicii of law governs later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of
the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the
fairness of adjudication."22 In this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court District of
Utah is governed by the In re Hong decision, precedent from that same court. A
departure from the bankruptcy court's decision in Hong must be supported by "special
justification. "23 When departing from the rule of stare decisis and overturning
applicable precedent courts should consider numerous factors:
1) whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable; 2) whether
parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it would create
an undue hardship; 3) whether the principles of law have developed to
such an extent as to leave the old rule "no more than a remnant of
abandoned doctrine;" and 4) whether the facts have changed in the
interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have "robbed the old
rule" of justification.24
22

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994)(emphasis added).

23

Arecibo Community Health Care, Inc. v. Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico, 270
F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2001)(citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct.
2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856,
116 S.Ct. 1793,135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996)).
24

Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 133 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901,90405, (N.M.2003)(citing Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305,
1998-NMSC-031(N.M.1998)(quotingPto«^Par^^o^ v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
855, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)).
17

The Bankruptcy Court has failed to analyze any of these factors. Instead the
court is attempting, in a sense, to appeal the Hong decision, which decision is not
before this court. The Bankruptcy Court should be bound by stare decisis, barring
"special justification," which the Bankruptcy Court has not produced. The Bankruptcy
Court is basically asking for an advisory opinion from the Utah Supreme Court on a
matter that it has already decided and which it is bound to follow excluding "special
justification."
Thus, given the decision in Hong and the adoption of Hong by the certifying
court in In re Linda Marie Mount there is no uncertainty of law as required by Rule 41
to certify a question to this Court. The status of this particular question as it related to
the Bankruptcy Court was certain. The Bankruptcy Court held in Hong that "'amounts
contributed' under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii) includes, but is not limited to,
those amounts rolled over from ERISA-qualified plans to an IRA Annuity." The
bankruptcy court again adopted Hong in In re Mount. These cases directly control the
bankruptcy court via stare decisis, as the only controlling law for the bankruptcy court
and should therefore have been followed without certification to this Court. The First
Circuit has outlined two circumstances where departure from the doctrine of stare
decisis is warranted: "The first arises when '[a]n existing panel decision may be
undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the
Supreme Court, an en banc opinion, or a statutory overruling.' In the second
circumstance, '[w]hen emergent Supreme Court case law calls into question a prior
18

opinion of another court, that court should pause to consider its likely significance
before giving effect to an earlier decision/"25 Neither of these circumstances is present
in this case. Thus, stare decisis controls, there is no uncertain state of Utah law and
this certified question is moot.
CONCLUSION
Because the plain meaning of the "amounts contributed," the existing caselaw
from other jurisdictions, industry standards and United States statutes all treat a
rollover as a contribution, the certified question should be answered similarly. Thus,
the Trustee, Stephen W. Rupp respectfully asks this court to include the debtor's
rollover as an "amount contributed" as such term is used in UCA 78-23-5(b)(ii).
Dated this tfl

day of October, 2003.

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Stephen W. Ri
Attorneys fori

25

Arecibo Community Health Care, Inc. v. Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico, 270
F.3d 17,23 (1st Cir. 2001)(citing Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st
Cir.1995) and Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d
136, 141 (1st Cir.2000)).
19
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
Bankruptcy Number: O1-JAB35072

In re:

Chapter 7

TAE SUN HONG and BOK R. HONG,
Debtors.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING
OBJECTION TO CLAIMED EXEMPTION

Pending before the court is the Chapter 7 Trustee's Objection To Claimed Exemptions
(Trustee's Objection). The Trustee's Objection necessitates a determination of two underlying
issues: First, whether an IRA estabhshed and funded prepetition from funds rolled over from an
ERISA-qualified plan is exempt from the estate under 11 U.S.C § 541(c)(2);1 and second, if the
IRA is property of the estate, whether the property is exempt under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-235(l)(a)(x) or 78-23-6.
The Chapter 7 Trustee (Trustee) asserts that the funds are property of the estate under
§ 541(c), and objects to Tae Sun Hong and Bole R. Hong, the chapter 7 debtors herein (Debtors),

All future references arc to Title 11 of the United States Code unlcis otherwise noted.
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claiming the funds in the individual Retirement Account invested in an annuity (IRA Annuity) as
exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), The Trustee maintains that the funds in
the IRA Annuity are not exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii)> In response,
Debtors argue that the funds in the IRA Annuity are not property of the estate. Debtors assert
that because the JR A Annuity was created by a rollover from a plan qualified under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C § 1001 et
^.(ERISA-qualified), to which 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) would apply, the IRA Annuity also is
protected. Alternatively, Debtors argue that the funds in die IRA Annuity are exempt under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) or 78-23-6.
After due consideration ot the stipulated or otherwise undisputed facts, the parties' briefs
and arguments, and following an independent review of the applicable caselaw, the Court
concludes that the funds in the IRA Annuity are property of the estate and that neither Utah Code
Ann §§ 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) nor 78-23-6 exempt the funds from execution. The basis for the
decision is set forth below.
FACTS
Debtor Bok Hong established the IRA Annuity on January 22, 2001. The IRA was
established by the Debtor with funds rolled over from an ERISA-qualified 401 (k) account, and is in
the form of an annuity. The only deposits made into the IRA Annuity were: (1) January 22, 2001
in the amount of $47,090.70, and, (2) Fcbmary 23, 2001 in the amount of $34,866.24. The only
withdrawals made from the IRA Annuity were: (1) February 28, 2001 in the amount of $3,333.34,
and; (2) September 25,2001 in the amount of 53,333.34. The balance of funds in the IRA Annuity
as of September 30, 2001 was $78,102.47.
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On October 11,2001, Debtors filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Debtors claimed
their interest in the ERA Annuity exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) on Schedule
C, filed the same date as the petition. The IRA Annuity was listed on Debtors* Schedule B as
personal property valued at $77,683. According to Schedule I, alsofiledOctober 11,2001 > Debtors
are not receiving distributions from the IRA Annuity. Debtors did not amend Schedule I. The
Trustee timely filed the Trustee's Objection on December 12,2001. On April 9,2002, Debtors filed
an Amended Schedule C to reflect that they no longer claimed the funds in the IRA Annuity as
exempt property. The IRA Annuity is listed on Amended Schedule B as personal property, with the
caveat that the IRA Annuity is '4(n]ot property of the estate pursuant to Section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code."2 The ERA Annuity remains valued at $77,683 on Amended Schedule B. No
documents were presented at the hearing reflecting the creation of or terms of the IRA Annuity (IRA
Annuity documents). Debtors concede that the IRA Annuity documents do not contain antialienation language.
DECISION
Jurisdiction and Burden of Proof
This matter is core <is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Therefore, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1334, andDUCivR 83-7.1(a), which automatically refers bankruptcy cases
and proceedings to this Court for hearing and determination, this Court can enter the order set forth
2

Because the Debtors amended their schedules to assert the funds in the ERA
Annuity are not property of the estate after the Trustee's Objection was filed, the only matter
actually pending before the court is the Trustee's Objection. However, at oral argument the
parties agreed that the court should first decide the Debtors' argument that the funds in the IRA
Annuity are not property of the estate, and, if the funds are determined to be property of the
estate, the Debtors would also make their argument that the IRA Annuity is exempt under state
law.
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herein.
A party objecting to a claimed exemption has the burden of proving that the subject property
is not exempt. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c); In re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. III 1997).
However, once the objecting party has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the debtor
to prove that such property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate. Altura Partnership v. Breninc,
Inc., (In re B.I. Financial Services Groups., Inc.) 854 F.2d 351,354 (9th Cir. 1988)(the proponent
of the argument that property is held in trust and is therefore not property of the estate has the burden
of establishing the original trust relationship).
11U.S.C8 541.
Section 541(a)(1) provides that all 'legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property"
become property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Therefore, it is first necessary to determine
if the funds in the IRA Annuity are property of the estate before evaluating whether they may be
exempt under Utah law. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (l99l)("No property can be
exempted (and thereby immunized), however* unless if first falls within the bankruptcy estate/*).
Debtors initially argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S.
753 (1992), should lead this Court to conclude that an IRA is not property of the estate. In
Patterson, the court concluded that a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified retirement plan is
excluded from property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S-C § 541(c)(2). Carbaugh v.
Carbaugh (In re Carbaugh), BAP No. KS-01-029, 2002 WL 825171, *3 (10th Cir. BAP May I,
2002)(citing Orr v. Yuhas (In re Yulw\j. 104 F.3d 612, 614 (3d Cir. 1997))(Under Patterson,
debtor's interest in ERISA-qualifed plan is completely excluded from bankruptcy estate).
Section 541(c)(2) provides:
I,\LAVAOPlNIONS\Opin363.wpd
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A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of thadebtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this
title.
11 U.S.C.S 541(c)(2).
Recognizing that the beneficial interest must be contained in a trust, it is necessary to
determine whether the IRA Annuity in this case satisfies that requirement. For the purposes of this
discussion, annuities are generally categorized as either fixed or variable. If the annuity is fixed, it
"cannot constitute [a] trust[] within the meaning of § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code unless the
annuity and endowment contracts that form the basis for said annuities constitute trusts under
relevant state law." Pineo v. Fulton (In re Fulton), 240 B.R. 854,866-67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999).
In this case, because the IRA Annuity documents are not in evidence, it is impossible to determine
if annuity and endowment contracts exist to form the basis for a trust. However, to the extent the
IRA Annuitymay be fixed, this Court is persuaded by the exhaustive analysis set forth mFulton, 240
B.R. at 866 n.14 and particular attention should be paid thereto.
If the IRA Annuity is variable, then § 541(c)(2) does not apply inasmuch as the IRA was
funded by a prepetition rollover from an ERISA-qualified plan. Instructive on this issue is In re
Ekanger, 1999 WL 671866, *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 17,1999), wherein the court stated:
ERISA contains no language imposing an anti-alienation requirement on funds
withdrawn from a qualified plan or rolled-over to a tax-qualified IRA. It is solely
because of the anti-alienation requirement that the debtor's interest in an ERISAqualified plan does not come into the bankruptcy estate: essentially, the ERISA plan
is treated like a spendthrift trust. IRA's, by contrast, are not subject to any legal
restriction on alienation or anticipation. An IRA is simply a creature of the Internal
Revenue Code designed to encourage taxpayers to save for retirement. That an
assignment or premature withdrawal of the funds in such an account might have
adverse tax consequences does not, in and of itself, constitute a Restriction on the
transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust" such as to result in the
exclusion of the funds from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, an IRA IALAW\QPlNlONS\Opin363.wpd
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even one funded by roll-over from an ERIS A-quahfied pension plan - is property of
the bankruptcy estate.
In re Ekcmger, 1999 WL 671866, *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 17,1999); accord. Eisenberg v. Houck
(In re Houck), 181 B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Pa, 1995).
Debtors concede that the ERA Annuity is not ERISA-qualified and, as a result, there is no
federal anti-alienation restriction. They also conceded that there is no anti-alienation language in
the underlying documents of the IRA Annuity. Debtors contend, however, that there is state law that
restricts the transfer of the beneficial interest. Stated differently* Debtors appear to argue that at the
moment the funds leave the ERISA-qualified restriction they are somehow protected by similar
restrictions provided for under state law, namely Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5.
Rather than relying on ihe language ot Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 for the purpose of claiming
an exemption, Debtors urge this Court to look to Che policy of the exemption statute and conclude
that for the purposes of § 541(c)(2), the spirit of the state statute satisfies the definition of
"applicable nonbankruptcy law." This assertion is not persuasive for two reasons. First, Debtors
seek to use an exemption statute to argue that the funds in the IRA Annuity are not property of the
estate. This expansion of both ERISA and § 541(c)(2) is improper. Carbaugh, 2002 WL 825171,
*4 (uncommingled monies distributed from pension plans and placed in accounts not under the
auspices of ERISA do not remain protected by it, citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Funds., 39 R3d 1078,1081-82 (10* Cir. 1994). Second, Debtors reliance onln reMeehan,
102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997) is tenuous, as the analysis in Meehan is generally criticized as
misinterpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson. In Meehan it was held that the restriction
need not be contained m the IRA Annuity document because a Georgia statute contained a similar
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restriction. However, as set forth in In re Lowenschuss, 171 F J d 673,683-684 (9th Cif. 1999), the
analysis in Meehan is flawed. The court in Lowenschnss stated as follows: "We believe that the
Supreme Court's statement in Patterson limited 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2) to its "natural reading" - a
debtor's interest in a trust may be excluded from the bankruptcy estate only if the trust contains a
transfer restriction, and that restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d at 683(citing Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758). Contrary to Meehan, the Supreme
Court was clarifying that § 541 refers to "applicable nonbankruptcy law," not exclusively to state
law. As stated in In re Zott, 225 B.R. 160,165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998):
To accept the premise espoused in Meehan* that a transfer restriction within a state
statute is sufficient to meet the requirements of § 541(c)(2), would render the
language 'enforceable under nonbankruptcy law' nugatory and meaningless
surplusage because a state statute (nonbankruptcy law) is obviously enforceable
under state law (nonbankruptcy law).
ZotU 225 B.R. at 165(cited with approval in Lowenschuss, 171 R3d at 683).
Furthermore, Lowenschuss recognized that the trust instrument must contain the restriction,
and the applicable nonbankruptcy law merely provides a means to enforce that restriction:
Only if the transfer restriction contained in the trust instrument is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law can the debtor's beneficial interest in that trust be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate. Because a debtor must be able to enforce the
transfer restriction contained in a trust instrument under applicable nonbankruptcy
law, and because [the state statute] does not provide a means to enforce a transfer
restriction contained in a trust, (the state statute] cannot operate to exclude from the
bankruptcy estate Debtor's interest in the (non ERISA-quaiified plan].
Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d al 684-85.
Because it is impossible to determine whether the IRA Annuity contains the requisite
restriction absent the ERA Annuity documents, the funds therein are property of th? estate. As a
result, it is necessary to address the state exemption statutes set forth below.
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Utah Code Ann. 3 78-23-5(1)(aKx)
Alternati vely, Debtors argue that should the funds in the IRA Annuity be included in property
of the estate, they are exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), which exempts property
held for or payable to an individual that is described in various sections of the Internal Revenue
Code;
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other assets held for or
payable to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is
described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408,408A, 409,414(d),
or 414(e) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended;...
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x).
Since the funds in the IRA Annuity fall within Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) because
they are held in an arrangement that is described in Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, they
are exempt from execution, unless another provision of the Utah exemption statute allows execution.
The Trustee argues that Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii), which excludes from the exemption
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)0O, any contribution made to an IRA within one year of filing
for bankruptcy, is precisely such a provision.
It is undisputed that Debtors established the IRA Annuity with funds rolled over from an
ERISA-qualified 401(k) account on January 22,2001, approximately ten months before the October
11, 2001 petition date. Therefore, one criteria under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) is met.
However, the question remains whether rolling over funds from an ERISA-qualified plan to an IRA
Annuity constitutes a "contribution" for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii). The
term "contribution" is not defined in the statute. The Debtors argue that "contribution" should be
restricted to additional funds placed in the IRA Annuity after its creation; that no "new" funds were
l\LAW\OHiNlONS\Opm363.wpd
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placed in the IRA Annuity, only a transfer in the form of existing funds from the ERIS A-qualified
plan to the IRA Annuity. Therefore, the Debtors assert that no funds were "contributed'* to the IRA
within a year of filing. The Trustee, on the other hand^ asserts that the statute contains no restriction
on the term "contribution," and if the State legislature has wished to exclude rollover contributions
from § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii), it would have done so. The Trustee's argument that the Debtors* rollover
of funds to the IRA Annuity is a "contribution" is more persuasive.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b) sets forth two exclusions from the exemption provided for
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x):
(b) the exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does not apply to:
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as
those terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the United States Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a
debtor within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b).
Subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1) expressly references the Internal Revenue
Code definition of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-23-5(1 )(b)(i), thus reflecting the legislature's awareness and ability to make reference to
definitions within the Internal Revenue Code. Subsection (b)(ii), however, makes no reference to
any definitions in the Internal Revenue Code, which uses "contribution" in a variety of circumstances
to describe dollar limitations on new funds placed yearly into an IRA, and has extensive regulations
on rolling over ERISA qualified funds into various other tax advantaged accounts. Juxtaposed with
.subsection (b)(i), it must be presumed that the legislatures exclusion or omission of a reference to
the Internal Revenue Code was intentional

See SINGER, STATUTES A N D STATUTORY
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CONSTRUCTION § 47:23

(6th ed, 2000)(stating that the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,

"is strengthened where a thing is .provided in one part of the statute and omitted in another.").
Although this conclusion can be overcome by a strong indication of contrary legislative intent or
policy, the present statute is silent on those considerations and no legislative history exists from
which to make an inference. Id. If the Utah legislature intended to differentiate between various
types of contributions, it would have done so by express reference to their definitions within the
Internal Revenue Code. See e.g. 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(dcfining "Rollover contribution"); SiNGER,
at § 47:27 ("[W]hen the statutory term is undefined, that term must be given its ordinary and
popularly understood meaning. There is a presumption that the legislature intended to use the actual
words it utilizes in the statute, which in turn . . . are intended to be utilized in the ordinary and
common meanings.")(intemal citations omitted). Therefore, "amounts contributed" under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii) includes, but is not limited to, those amounts roiled over from
ERISA-quaiified plans lo an IRA Annuity.
A similar situation presented itself in the interpretation of a Pennsylvania exemption statute
in In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501 (3d Cir. 1997), wherein the court was faced with determining if a
rollover of funds from an ERISA-quahfied plan to an IRA was a contribution. The significance of
the decision was that if it was deemed a contribution, the debtor would only be permitted to exempt
the contribution up to $ 15,000. The Pennsylvania statute in effect at the date of the debtor's petition,
and at the date of the decision in Barshak, provided in pertinent part:
(b) Retirement funds and accounts. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following money or other property of the
judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment or execution on a judgment:
(ix) Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401 (a), 403(a) and (b),
408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-514,26 U.S.C. §
I:\LAW\OPIN10NS\Opin363.wpd
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401(a), 403(a) and (b), 408 or 409), the appreciation thereon, the income and the
benefits or annuity payable thereunder. This subparagraph shall not apply to:
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund within one
year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund in excess of $15,000
within a one-year period.
42Pa.C.S.A. § 8124(b)(l)(1997).
Based on a plain reading of subsection (B), the Barshak court stated that "subsection B
simply does not distinguish between 'rollover contributions' and 'contributions' as it places the
limitation of the exemption on amounts 'contributed.' It would be a pure judicial construct to
exclude ftrollover contributions* from subsection B, and we will not engage in that process/'
Barsltak, 106 R3d at 504. The court also acknowledged and refused to address the policy argument
that the statute was enacted to exempt retirement funds, in general, from attachment and execution,
and stated:
But even if this policy argument were well-founded, a point on which we express no
opinion, the plain language of subsection B compels us to reach our result. We are
not free to ignore the clear language of a Pennsylvania statute merely because by
rewriting the statute we arguably would act consistently with a legislative policy. In
the end, the case comes down to this: we rule on the basis of what the law is rather
than what a party wishes it could be.
Id. at 506 (internal citation omitted).
In 1998, the Pennsylvania legislature amended subsection (b)(l)(ix), most notably
subsections (A) and (B), to read as follows:
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund within one
year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly
rolled over from other funds which are exempt from attachment under this
paragraph
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund in excess of
$ 15,000 within a one-year period. This sliall not include amounts directly rolled over
jrom other funds which are exempt from attachment under this paragraph.
June 4, 2002
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8124(b)(l)(ix)(A)(as amended 1998)(emphasis added).3
In so doing the Pennsylvania legislature exercised its authority and amended the statute to
expressly exclude those amounts contributed as a result of a rollover. The instant matter is no
different, and absent reference in the statute to the contrary, this Coun will not deviate from the
statute's plain meaning and attempt to parse-out the various types of contributions defined in the
Internal Revenue Code, If the Utah legislature wishes to amend Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii)
to exclude amounts contributed by the rollover of funds into an exempt plan, it has the authority to
do so. Therefore, having established that the IRA Annuity was funded by Debtors via a contribution
within one year of the petition date, Debtors may not claim an exemption pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§78-23-5(l)(a)(x).
Utah Code Ann. 8 78-23-6
Debtors also argue that the property is exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6 which

Ihe applicable section of 42 Pa C.S.A. § 8124(b) as amended in 1998 reads in its entirety as
follows:

(b) Retirement funds and accounts. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following money or other property of the judgment
debtor shall be exempt from attachment or execution on a judgment:
(ix) Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401(a), 403(a)and (b), 408,408A,
409 or 510 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Public law 99-514, 26 U S.C. § 401(a). 403(a)
and (bK 408, 408A, 409 or 530), the appreciation thereon, the income therefrom, the benefits or
annuity payable thereunder and transfers and rollovers between such funds. This subparagraph
shall not apply to:
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund within one year before the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly rolled over from other funds
which are exempt from attachment under this paragraph.
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund in excess of
$15,000 within a one-year period. This shall not include amounts directly rolled over
from other funds which are exempt from attachment under this paragraph.
(C) Amounts deemed to be fraudulent conveyances.
42 Pa C S A. § 8124fl>)< Ofix)(A)(as amended 1998)
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provides, in relevant part:
[A]n individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the individual and his dependants:
(3) assets held, payments, and amounts payable under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan providing benefits other than by reason of illness or
disability
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6.
The court in In re Swensen, 130 B.R, 99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991), determined that IRAs are
not exempt because they fail to fall within the parameters of "annuity or other similar plan,"
Debtors, however, argue that Swensen is inapplicable here on two grounds: first, because the statute
expressly recognizes an "annuity/' which exists in some form in this case as stipulated to by the
parties, and; second, that from a policy standpoint an IRA should be treated in a fashion similar to
other ERIS A-qualified plans. Neither argument is persuasive under the plain language of the statute*
In order to accept Debtors first proposition, that an annuity is exempt to the extent it satisfies
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3), it is necessary to ignore the first statement of the exemption statute
which allows a person to exempt property "reasonably necessary for the support of the individual
and his dependants." Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6. In this case, Debtors have not claimed that the
IRA Annuity is reasonably necessary for their support. Despite two withdrawals, Debtors did not
list any regular distribution from funds in the IRA Annuity on their Schedule I - Current Income of
Individual Debtors. Debtors also have not alleged that the two prepetition withdrawals were
necessary for their support. Rather, Debtors argue that this Court should look forward and speculate
as to their need for regular distributions in the future. This argument, however, is without merit
inasmuch as it is expected that everyone will, one day, require regular distributions from their
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retirement savings. To conclude otherwise would render the language in thefirstparagraph of Utah
Code Ann § 78-23-6 superfluousand without meaning.
With respect to Debtors argument that an IRA Annuity should be treated in a fashion similar
to other ERISA-qualified plans as a matter of policy, this Court declines to enter into a legislative
role. Had Congress intended to equip IRA's with anti-alienation lunguage, it could have done so.
Debtors arc not entitled to the benefit of an exemption claimed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Debtors' interest in the IRA Annuity is property of the estate; and it is
further
ORDERED, that the Trustee's Objection To Claimed Exemptions is SUSTAINED to the
extent Debtors claim an exemption pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6, and that exemption is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Trustee's Objection To Claimed Exemptions is SUSTAINED to the
extent Debtors claim an exemption pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x), that exemption
is DENIED.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO CLAIMED
EXEMPTION upon the following by mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the <*L day of June,
2002, to:
Carolyn Montgomery, Esq.
3285 Oakcliff Drive
Sail Lake City, UT 84124
Attorney for Debtors
David R, Williams, Esq.
Woodbury & Kesler
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Attorney for Chapter 7 Trustee

Deputy Clerk
United States Bankruptcy Court
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

In re
LINDA MARIE MOUNT,

Bankruptcy Case No. 02C-29694
Chapter 7

Debtor.

ORDER SUSTAINING TRUSTEE'S
OBJECTION TO CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION

This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of September, 2002. Joel T. Marker, the
Chapter 7 Trustee (the 'Trustee") in this case, appeared in behalf of himself, and James C
Haskins appeared in behalf of Linda Marie Mount (the 'Debtor")'
On August 28, 2001, the Debtor rolled her 401 (K) plan into an ERA plan. The total
amount of funds rolled over into die IRA was $10,708.10. On June 12, 2002, less than one year
later, the Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 and claimed the IRA fluids exempt
under U,C A. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(xX The Trustee objects to Debtor's claimed exemption arguing
that, because the IRA was established within one year of the Debtor's petition date, tlie IRA is
not exempt because U.CA. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) provides diat, with respect to pension funds,
amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor within one year of
bankruptcy are not exempt. In support of his objection, the Trustee cites to In re Tae Sun Hong

no*>aRQAnift

and Bok R. Hong, case No. 01-35072 JAB (Bankr. D. Ut June 4,2002), for the proposition that
funds rolled over from an ERISA qualified plan into an IRA are a "contribution" within the
meaning of U.CA. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) and therefore not exempt if rolled over within one year of
the petitbn date. The Debtor argues that Tae Sun Hong is wrongly decided, that a rollover is not
a "contribution" because no "new" funds are placed into a pension as a result of a rollover and
that the Court should mierprtt exemption statutes liberally in favor of debtors and therefore allow
the exemption.
After considering the pleadings and argument of counsel and after thoroughly reviewing
the law with respect to this controversy, it is die opinion of this Court that Tae Sun Hong
correctly interprets the effect of U.CA. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) on Debtor's claimed exemption under
78-23-5(1 )(a)(x). Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Trustee's objection to Debtor's claimed exemption under U.C A.
§ 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) is sustained, and it is further
ORDERED that the Court, in so ruling, makes no determination as to the amount which
the Debtor may claim as exempt pursuant to U.CA. § 78-23-6(3); see In re Kerr. 65 B.R. 739
(Bankr. D. Utah 1986); In re Savage. 248 B.R. 573 (Bankr. D. Ark. 2000).
DATED this J ^ / day of September, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

GLEN B. CLARK, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
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